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1. Introduction
This paper explores an apparent tension between two widely held
views about logic: that logic is normative and that there are multiple
equally legitimate logics. The tension is this. If logic is normative, it
tells us something about how we ought to reason. If, as the pluralist
would have it, there are several correct logics, those logics make in-
compatible recommendations as to how we ought to reason. But then
which of these logics should we look to for normative guidance? I ar-
gue that inasmuch as pluralism draws its motivation from its ability
to defuse logical disputes—that is, disputes between advocates of ri-
val logics—it is unable to provide an answer: pluralism collapses into
monism with respect to either the strongest or the weakest admissible
logic.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a novel analysis
of the normative structure of logical disputes. Logical disputes involve
various types of normative assessments. In particular, I distinguish ex-
ternal assessments that question the correctness of the principles to
which the agent assessed holds herself, and internal ones by which
we criticize the agent for her failure to comply with her own princi-
ples. I identify and articulate the principles underlying these norma-
tive assessments. Section 3 offers a taxonomy of logical pluralisms and
investigates the extent to which each of the taxa leaves room for the
aforementioned normative assessments. Section 4 explores the conse-
quences of the fact that an important class of pluralisms—the class
that incorporates J.C. Beall and Greg Restall’s influential account—is
incompatible with external assessments. I demonstrate that the vulner-
ability of these views to the well-known ‘collapse argument’1 is a con-
sequence of their inability to account for such assessments. Ultimately
1. See G. Priest, “Logic: One or many?,” in J. Woods and B. Brown (eds.), Logi-
cal consequences: Rival approaches (Oxford: Hermes Scientific Publishers, 2001), G.
Priest, Doubt truth to be a liar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), S. Read,
“Monism: The one true logic,” in D. DeVidi and T. Kenyon (eds.), A Logical
approach to philosophy: Essays in honour of Graham Solomon (Springer, 2006) and
R. Keefe, “What logical pluralism cannot be,” Synthese 191 (2014).
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such forms of pluralism suffer an ‘upward’ collapse into monism with
respect to the strongest admissible logic. Section 5 investigates an al-
ternative form of pluralism according to which logics are correct only
relative to their appropriate domains of application. Drawing on the
literature on alethic pluralism, I argue that at least when it comes to
certain forms of cross-domain discourse such forms of domain-relative
pluralism are subject to a different but symmetrically analogous form
of ‘downward’ collapse into monism with respect to the weakest logic.
Section 6 argues that on account of the findings of the previous sec-
tion, the distinction between monism and domain-relative pluralism is
merely terminological. Finally, I conclude that the only viable forms of
‘pluralism’ in light of the normativity of logic are ones that allow for
normative conflicts and hence logical rivalry.
Before we proceed a number of preliminary remarks are in order.
For one, I rely on the controversial assumption that there is a sense in
which logic can be said to be normative. Gilbert Harman has famously
challenged the time-honored conception of logic as a normative disci-
pline.2 His objections have been developed and refined in various in-
teresting ways.3 I side with those who have sought to rehabilitate the
normativity of logic,4 However, those on the fence about the normative
status of logic may read the paper as a conditional claim. Certain kinds
of pluralists, who are firmly on the other side of the fence may read
it as a reductio.5 What is more, I assume that the connection between
2. See G. Harman, Change in view: Principles of reasoning (Cambridge: M.I.T.
Press, 1986).
3. See inter alia S. Dogramaci, “Reverse engineering epistemic rationality,” Phi-
losophy and phenomenological research 84 (2012), S. Dogramaci, “Communist con-
ventions for deductive reasoning,” Noûs 49 (2015) and C. Dutilh Novaes, “A
dialogical, multi-agent account of the normativity of logic,” Dialectica 69 (2015).
4. See in particular , J. MacFarlane, In what sense (if any) is logic normative
for thought?, 2004, F. Steinberger, “Consequence and normative guidance,”
Philosophy and phenomenological research 95 (2017). See F. Steinberger, “The nor-
mative status of logic,” in E. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy,
spring 2017 edition (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2017) for
a survey of the literature.
5. Note, however, that Beall and Restall (henceforth, ‘B&R’) declare a firm com-
mitment to the normativity of logic J. C. Beall and G. Restall, Logical pluralism
principles of logic and norms of reasoning can be rendered explicit in
the form of what John McFarlane has called a ‘bridge principle.’6 A
bridge principle can be represented schematically as follows:
• (?) If A1, . . . , An |= C, then N(α(A1), . . . , α(An), β(C)).
The principle takes the form of material conditional, where the condi-
tional’s antecedent states ‘facts’ about logical consequence and where
the principle’s consequent sets forth a normative constraint on the
agent’s doxastic attitudes (belief, disbelief, degree of belief) towards
the relevant propositions. The attitudes are represented by ‘α’ and ‘β’
on account of the fact that they may be (but need not be) distinct at-
titudes.7 Alternatively, a bridge principle’s antecedent might appeal
not to entailment facts but to the agent’s attitudes towards entailments
facts:
• (?-γ) If γ(A1, . . . , An |= C), then N(α(A1), . . . , α(An), β(C)),
where γ might represent the attitude of knowing, believing, etc. By
varying these different parameters, we can generate a considerable
number of bridge principles. Here, to illustrate, are three examples:
1. If A1, . . . An |= C, then S ought to believe C, if S believes the Ai.
2. If S believes that A1, . . . An |= C, then S ought not (believe the Ai
and disbelieve C).
3. If A1, . . . An |= C, then S has reason to ensure that cr(C) ≥ cr(A1) +
. . . + cr(An)− (n− 1)
In 1. ‘ought’ takes narrow scope with respect to the conditional in the
consequent. It simply states that one’s beliefs ought to be closed un-
der logical consequence. 2. is restricted to believed entailment. ‘Ought’
here takes wide scope over the embedded conditional. Consequently,
rather than prescribing a particular belief in the manner of 1., the
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
6. See MacFarlane, op. cit..
7. For simplicity’s sake, I set aside suspension of belief.
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principle proscribes configurations of attitudes in which the agent si-
multaneously believes the premises and disbelieves the conclusion. Fi-
nally, 3. is a principle governing degrees of belief, represented by the
agent’s credence function cr(·). Moreover, it employs the defeasible
‘has reason’-operator (as opposed to the strict ‘ought’). The principle
states that the agent has reason to ensure that her degrees of belief
respect the stated inequality.8
Furthermore, we distinguish three types of normative functions
logic might be thought to perform.9 Logic might be thought to deliver
• directives: first-personal instructions guiding the agent in her doxas-
tic conduct;
• evaluations: third-personal evaluative standards against which to
classify doxastic states as correct or incorrect.
• appraisals: third-personal norms that underwrite our attributions of
blame and praise to others.
Different bridge principles will be more or less well suited to play
a given normative role. For instance, principles like 1. and 3. whose
antecedents are insensitive to the agent’s recognitional abilities, are
unlikely to be serviceable as directives, because ordinary agents with
limited logical abilities are in no position to follow them. The same
goes for appraisals: it would be inappropriate to fault our epistemic
peers for failing to comply with normative principles they cannot pos-
sibly live up to. Directives and appraisals may thus be better expressed
by attitudinal principles exemplified by 2. That is not to say, however,
that there is no use for unrestricted principles; they naturally express
objective evaluative standards. After all, the logical coherence of my
doxastic state depends on what the logical facts are, not on what I take
8. The principle is proposed in this context by . It is well-known from prob-
ability logic, see E. Adams, A primer of probability logic (Stanford, CA: CSLI
Publications, 1998).
9. See F. Steinberger, “Three ways in which logic might be normative,” Journal
of philosophy (Forthcoming).
those facts to be. With these preliminaries in place, let us now turn to
our first order of business: the task of analyzing logical disputes.
2. Logical disputes
The pluralist’s role, in logic as elsewhere, tends to consist in defusing
disputes she regards as wrongheaded and futile. She seeks to do so by
demonstrating how, contrary to appearances, all parties to the dispute
can be right. Carnap regarded it as one of the ‘chief tasks’ of The logi-
cal syntax of language to ‘eliminate the standpoint’ according to which
there is but one ‘correct’ logic ‘together with the pseudo-problems and
wearisome controversies which arise as result of it’.10 His deflationary
spirit towards logical (and other, in particular metaphysical) disputes
is enshrined in his famous principle of tolerance. B&R too reject the
very possibility of logical dispute for admissible logics:11
We do not take different logics to be rival analyses of the one
fundamental notion (of logical consequence) because we think
that the one fundamental notion of logical consequence can be
made precise in different ways [. . . ] These different relations are
not in competition and they are not rivals. 12
Logical disputes, then, are ultimately ‘based on a confusion’ accord-
ing to the pluralist.13 Assuming she is right, the pluralist is a heroic
character who delivers us from our proclivity for getting embroiled in
fruitless squabbles.
With that, let us set the scene. Our story begins prior to the plural-
ist’s appearance, with the logical dispute between Clare and Ira. Clare
10. R. Carnap, The logical syntax of language (London: Routledge, 1937), p. xiv
11. Note that B&R do not regard any logic as a legitimate contender. Their
pluralism is confined to a restricted set of logics that satisfy their admissibility
criteria. Inasmuch as B&R and their pluralist brethren seek to dissolve logical
disputes with respect to admissible logics, my characterization is nevertheless
apt.
12. Beall and Restall, op. cit., p. 88
13. G. Russell, “Logical pluralism,” in E. Zalta (ed.), Stanford encyclodedia of
philosophy (2014)
philosophers’ imprint - 3 - vol. 0, no. 0 (march, 2018)
florian steinberger Logical Pluralism and Logical Normativity
and Ira are accomplished logicians and philosophers. They agree on
a significant number of thorny issues in the philosophy of logic. For
instance, both accept my assumption of logic’s normativity for reason-
ing, and that its normative role can be explicitly articulated by means
of bridge principles. Also, both are monists: they agree that there is but
one correct all-purpose logic. They even agree on what it means for a
logic to be correct.14 But here is the one significant point of disagree-
ment: Clare is an advocate of classical logic while Ira is an advocate
of intuitionistic logic. Ira is in the grip of Dummettian arguments in
favor of intuitionist revisions of our logical practices; Clare remains
unconvinced.15 Even after countless long nights of well-meaning and
intellectually honest debate the two are unable to overcome their dif-
ferences. It does not matter, for our purposes, who (if either of them)
is right. For the sake of the argument, though, let us assume that there
14. At a minimum, there are two ways in which logics might be said to be
correct, depending on whether one conceives of logic fundamentally as set-
ting forth what we might call (somewhat grandiosely) the laws of being or the
laws of thought. On the former view logic is, much like mathematics, ‘about the
world’ (see e.g. T. Williamson, “Justification, excuses and sceptical scenarios,”
in F. Dorsch and J. Dutant (eds.), The new evil demon (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Forthcoming)). It provides an account of the most general features
of reality. On the latter view logic is concerned primarily with our systems
of conceptual or linguistic representation. Its aim is, in Priest’s words, ‘to de-
termine what follows from what—what premises support what conclusions’
(Priest, op. cit., p. 196). My distinction is in line with Ole Hjortland’s helpful dis-
cussion of the opposition of Timothy Williamson’s ‘deflationary’ approach and
Graham Priest’s ‘metalinguistic’ approach (O. Hjortland, “Anti-exceptionalism
about logic,” Philosophical studies 174/3 (2016)). My aim here is not to take sides,
but simply to note that different conceptions of the nature and purpose of logic
entrain different notions of what it means for a logic to be correct. Of course,
some philosophers reject the very idea that logics can be meaningfully said to
be correct. This, famously, was Carnap’s view. It is also endorsed by Field, to
whom I return in section 3 (H. Field, “Pluralism in logic,” Review of symbolic
logic 2 (2009)).
15. I picked the dispute between classical and intuitionistic logic for ease of ex-
position. Justifiably or not, the Dummettian case for logical revision has some-
what fallen out of fashion. Nothing hangs on the specifics of the case, though.
The reader may plug in her favorite argument in support of non-classical logics
(quantum logics, relevant logics, dialetheic, paracomplete, supervaluationist,
etc.).
is a fact of the matter as to which logic is correct (and that one of the
two is).
Let us, then, take a closer look at Clare and Ira’s dispute, with a
view to making manifest the principles underpinning the normative
judgments, assessments and criticisms at the root of their dispute. The
principles in question, unlike the closely related standard bridge princi-
ples, have not been studied to my knowledge. A proper understanding
of the normative structure of logical disputes will thus be of indepen-
dent philosophical interest. As we will see, though, our analysis has
the further benefit of illuminating the normative implications of vari-
ous forms of pluralism.
In keeping with our provisional assumption of monism, let us begin
by spelling out the evaluative standard induced by the correct logic.
The following principle captures the idea:
(Objective) If A1, . . . An |=L C, then N(α(A1), . . . , α(An), β(C)).
(Objective) is a proto-bridge principle. Converting it into a full-fledged
principle requires that we specify a good deal of additional informa-
tion: the type of deontic operator featured, its scope, the type of doxas-
tic attitudes governed, etc. However, even at this level of abstraction, a
number of features are noteworthy. For one, the principle’s normative
role is evaluative. As such, our principle is not in the business of pro-
viding direct guidance to the agent, nor does it support criticisms or at-
tributions of blame. Its primary purpose, rather, is to serve as an objec-
tive synchronic standard that supports classifications of belief sets into
logically ‘correct’ and logically ‘incorrect’ ones.16 Accordingly, assum-
ing that ‘ought’ is the deontic operator featured in (Objective), ‘ought’
is itself to be understood as evaluative. Unlike deliberative or practical
16. See Steinberger, op. cit. for further discussion. See also e.g. K. Easwaran and
B. Fitelson, “Accuracy, coherence, and evidence,” in T. Szabo Gendler and
J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford studies in epistemology (2015), fn. 6, 7, 8 and M.
Titelbaum, “Rationality’s fixed point (Or: In defence of right reason),” in J.
Hawthorne (ed.), Oxford studies in epistemology (Oxford University Press, 2015),
p. 7 for examples of principles of rationality construed as evaluations in this
sense.
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‘ought’s, evaluative ones are not agentive. Instead they present certain
states of affairs as generally good or correct, and others not. As such
it is neither relativized to the agent’s ability to recognize entailments
(whence the non-relativized antecedent), nor is the ‘ought’ of the ‘can’-
implying variety.
For the sake of concreteness, it will be useful in the following to
consider a fully articulated principle:
(Objective -) If A1, . . . An |=L C, then S ought not (believe the Ai
and disbelieve C).
I do not endorse (Objective -) or any other specific principle here. As
I discuss in section 3 below, negative principles have certain draw-
backs.17 Nevertheless, it will serve as our go-to principle for purposes
of illustration. My aim here is merely to identify the general form of
the principles underwriting the normative assessments within logical
disputes. I leave the task of determining the specifics of the principle’s
parameter settings for another time.
That said, (Objective -) is negative (whence the minus sign), because
it enjoins us not to disbelieve certain propositions (given one’s belief
in the premises), as opposed to issuing a positive injunction to believe.
Also, it is a wide scope principle. Finally, ‘L’ stands for whatever logic
is in fact correct (in our example, the candidates are the classical con-
sequence relation (|=C ) or the intuitionistic one (|=I ). The correct logic,
whichever it is, induces a corresponding objective evaluative norm.
A surprisingly under-explored fact in the literature on bridge prin-
ciples is that principles in the mould of (Objective) fail to capture a
central dimension of our normative assessments. Let us imagine that
intuitionistic logic turns out to be correct. Suppose now that Clare, the
classical logician, infers A from ¬¬A (where she has no independent
grounds for believing A).18 The inference, clearly, falls foul of intuition-
17. For a fuller discussion, see Steinberger, op. cit..
18. By ‘no independent grounds’ I mean that there are no grounds for forming
the belief in A other than its putative logical relation to ¬¬A. The inference
occurs on the basis of Clare’s belief or supposition that ¬¬A.
istic strictures. However, (Objective) does not tell us this. It detects only
sins of omission—when an agent fails to appropriately take into account
the logical implications of her beliefs; it provides no safeguard against
sins of comission—when an agent draws inferences that are not sanc-
tioned by the correct logic. What is needed, therefore, is an additional
principle that grounds the negative evaluation of Clare’s inference:
(Objective Commissive) Assuming that (Objective) is correct with
respect to L and that S, has no logic-independent grounds for be-
lieving C, the following holds:
If it is the case that (S is permitted to believe C, if S is permitted to
believe the Ai), then A1, . . . An |=L C.
Note that the restriction is indispensable. It might well be permissible
for S to believe C on account of C’s being non-logically (analytically or
materially) entailed by the Ai. Instantiating the principle in the context
of our example and contraposing we arrive at the conclusion that since
¬¬A 6|=I A, Clare’s inference to A is impermissible. For symmetry’s
sake, we should rename (Objective) and it instantiations, ‘(Objective
Omissive)’.
The example of Clare’s erroneous inference highlights another im-
portant feature of logical disputes: by Clare’s own lights, the inference
was not erroneous. That is, the correct standards of logical coherence,
as codified by (Objective Omissive) and (Objective Commissive), devi-
ate from what Clare takes the correct standards to be: her subjective
evaluative standpoint. The principle expressing Clare’s evaluative stand-
point must therefore articulate the evaluative standard to which she
holds not just herself, but all of us based on her understanding of what
the correct consequence relation is. It can be formulated thus:
(Subjective Omissive) If S endorses A1, . . . An |=L C, then, S main-
tains that, for every agent S′, N(α(A1), . . . , α(An), β(C)).19
19. Given our assumptions, it is natural to stipulate that one endorses a logic
just in case one takes it to be correct or among the best available logics.
philosophers’ imprint - 5 - vol. 0, no. 0 (march, 2018)
florian steinberger Logical Pluralism and Logical Normativity
The corresponding negative principle is this:
(Subjective Omissive -) If S endorses A1, . . . An |=L C, then, S main-
tains that, for every agent S′, S′ ought not (believe the Ai and dis-
believe C).
Clare and Ira’s evaluative standpoints can thus be represented by the
appropriate classical and intuitionistic variants of (Subjective Omis-
sive). Both contend that their respective subjective evaluative stand-
points are in line with the correct objective evaluative standard repre-
sented by (Objective Omissive).
Notice that according to (Subjective Omissive) the agent commits
herself to a particular evaluative standard by endorsing a logic, she
does not have to endorse particular logical laws for those laws to be
normatively binding. That is, in endorsing the logic, the agent will-
ingly takes on a wholesale commitment to all concomitant normative
demands, whether or not she is in a position to recognize them. (Sub-
jective Omissive), while relativized to the agent, is thus still an evalua-
tive principle and so is not relativized to the agent’s beliefs or logical
knowledge.
(Subjective Omissive) too requires a commissive counterpart. When
Clare infers A from ¬¬A (where she has no independent grounds for
believing A), the inference is licensed from Clare’s evaluative stand-
point, but not from Ira’s thus prompting criticism. Ira’s criticism of
Clare would thus seem to rely on a subjective version of (Objective
Commission):
(Subjective Commissive) Assuming S endorses (Subjective Omis-
sive) with respect to L and that the agent assessed, S′, has no logic-
independent grounds for believing C, the following holds: If it is the
case that (S′ is permitted to believe C, if S′ is permitted to believe
the Ai), then A1, . . . An |=L C.
Imagine now that Ira illicitly (by her own intuitionistic standards)
appeals to the law of double negation elimination (DNE) in her rea-
soning. Clare is well within her rights to criticize Ira. Clearly, though,
she does so not because Ira’s reasoning is at odds with her (Clare’s)
classical viewpoint—it patently is not—but because Ira is contraven-
ing her own (Ira’s) evaluative standards. In other words, Ira manifests
a kind of internal incoherence. Call this an internal normative assess-
ment in contrast to the principles we have previously encountered all
of which underwrite external assessments. Internal assessments criti-
cize the agent’s failure to reason in conformity with her own evaluative
standpoint; external assessments relate to criticisms of the evaluative
standard itself. Here is how we might capture internal assessments:
(Internal Ommissive) S D [endorse A1, . . . An |=L C only if P]
Here D is a deontic operator (‘ought’ or ‘has reason’) and P is an
appropriate pattern of S’s attitudes towards the premises Ai and the
conclusion C. Spelled out in the manner of our stock example we get:
(Internal Omissive -) S ought to [endorse A1, . . . An |=L C only if (S
does not disbelieve C, if S believes the Ai)].
Internal criticisms are grounded in a (presumed) obligation to ensure
that one manage one’s beliefs in ways consistent with one’s own evalu-
ative standards. One is incoherent in this sense if one endorses a logic
(and the constraints on belief it imposes) while believing a premise of
a valid argument (by that logic’s standards) and simultaneously disbe-
lieving its conclusion.
The principle is characterized by its distinctive logical form: the de-
ontic operator takes super wide scope over the conditional as a whole
(as opposed to familiar wide scope principles that typically operate on
the consequent of the main conditional only). S can in principle dis-
charge her obligations in one of two ways: either by conforming to her
evaluative standards or by revising those very standards by endorsing
a different logic. Though both are live options in principle, in practice
the route of logical revision, like that of religious conversion, is one
scarcely travelled. One does not renounce one’s logical commitments
on a whim.
Clearly, as Ira’s example shows, internal criticisms might also target
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errors of commission relative to the agent’s own evaluative standard:
(Internal Commissive) S D [endorse L only if (if A1, . . . An 6|=L
C, then S does not infer C from the Ai, unless there are logic-
independent grounds for doing so)].
D, as before, might either be our ought or our has reason-operator.
A final comment concerning the peculiar normative role performed
by internal criticisms: internal criticisms underwrite standpoint-
relative third-personal assessments, which makes them appraisals.
What makes them peculiar is that while they are relativized to the
appraisee’s evaluative standpoint, they are not relativized to the ap-
praisee’s recognitional capacities. For all we have said, our appraisal
of Ira would be equally negative in a case where she fails to take into
account an extraordinarily complex intuitionistic argument as it would
be in the case in which, in a careless moment, she slips up and helps
herself to an application of DNE in everyday reasoning. In both cases
she falls foul of her own standards. All the same, we ordinarily do
want to distinguish between these two types of failings: the first is
due to her all-too-human cognitive limitations; the second is an honest
mistake that warrants criticism. To perform both types of assessments,
I think of appraisals as variably exigent: on the generous end of the
spectrum we allot blame relative to the agent’s actual logical capaci-
ties; on the unforgiving end of the spectrum we allot blame relative to
the agent’s evaluative standards regardless of whether she is in a posi-
tion to live up to them. In between, our appraisals might be relativized
to increasingly demanding standards as to which logical implications
of the agent’s preferred logic she may reasonably be expected to ap-
preciate. (Internal Commissive) sits flatly at the unforgiving end of the
spectrum. But it is not hard to see how it might be tempered by re-
stricting the principle’s antecedent to the implications the agent takes
to obtain or can reasonably be expected to obtain.
In summary, we have uncovered that logical disputes are comprised
of two main types of normative assessments: external ones and inter-
nal ones. External assessments are concerned with the correctness of
the evaluative standards; internal ones are concerned with coherence
between the agent’s reasoning and the subjective standards to which
she holds herself.20 Among the external assessments we may distin-
guish (i) the objective evaluative standard and (ii) the agents’ subjec-
tive evaluative standpoints. Finally, all of these assessments stem from
principles, which, in turn, come in two flavors: omissive ones and com-
missive ones. This rounds up our analysis of the normative structure
of logical disputes for now. We return to these principles at the end of
the next section. First, though, we must introduce the pluralist.
3. Pluralism
The time has come for the pluralist to make her long awaited appear-
ance. The pluralist maintains that the disputing parties’ claims are not
genuinely in conflict.21 For example, although Clare accepts and Ira
rejects DNE, the pluralist contends that both can be right. Pluralisms
differ over how they account for this possibility. In the following I clas-
sify pluralisms accordingly.
Let us immediately set us aside a number of uncontroversial (and
hence uninteresting) forms of pluralism. No one doubts that there
is a plurality of ‘pure logics’ in Graham Priest’s terminology. 22 Not
even the most steadfast monist disputes that there are any number
of mathematical structures that we customarily call ‘logics’ and that
may make for worthwhile objects of mathematical study. Nor does the
fact that many such logics lend themselves more or less well to dif-
ferent applications—for example, classical propositional logic may be
used to model electric circuits, the Lambek calculus naturally models
phrase structure grammars, and so on—pose a challenge to the monist.
Finally, one may generate a form of pluralism by varying one’s log-
ical vocabulary.23 Which arguments count as valid, depends on our
20. Of course an agent may also criticize peers who share her own (the agent’s)
evaluative standards when they fail to comply with them. In such cases external
and internal criticisms coincide.
21. There are certain exceptions, which we will consider in due course.
22. Priest, op. cit.
23. See A. Tarski, “On the concept of logical consequence,” in J. Corcoran (ed.),
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choices as to which expressions we treat as semantically invariant and
which we take to be open to reinterpretation. Russell argues that differ-
ent conceptions about the nature of the constituents of arguments—i.e.
whether we conceive of them as sentences, propositions, statements,
etc.—induce different logics.24 While these accounts certainly make for
more interesting forms of pluralism, I nevertheless want to set them
aside for present purposes. In what follows I assume that we are work-
ing with a fixed set of logical constants and a settled account of the
nature of truth-bearers.
Wherein, then, does the disagreement between the monist and plu-
ralist reside? The question of logical pluralism I am after can only be
meaningfully raised against the background of the posit that there is,
over and above questions of local applicability, a core or ‘canonical’ 25
application of logic. The pluralist maintains, and the monist disputes,
that the core function of logic can be fulfilled by more than one logic.
But what exactly does the canonical application of logic amount to? Ac-
cording to Priest, logic’s central application is to deductive reasoning.
It consists in determining ‘what follows from what—what premises
support what conclusion—and why’ (idem). Philosophers may dis-
agree over the nature of the core application.26 Regardless of its nature,
though, I assume here that there is such a core role for logic to play. A
meaningful pluralist challenge amounts to the claim that at least two
logics are equally suitable to play the core role.
The first candidate that fits the bill is what sometimes goes by the
name of meaning-variance pluralism.27 The label stems from the view’s
adopted strategy for deflating logical disputes: it is possible for Clare
and Ira to both be right because the disputants attach different mean-
ings to the terms involved. Meaning-variance can take multiple forms
Logic, semantics, metamathematics, 2 edition (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983) and A.
Varzi, “On logical relativity,” Philosophical issues 12 (2002).
24. G. Russell, “One true logic?,” Journal of philosophical logic 37 (2008)
25. Priest, op. cit., p. 196
26. See fn. 14 above.
27. Cf. O. Hjortland, “Logical pluralism, meaning-variance, and verbal dis-
putes,” Australasian journal of philosophy 91 (2013).
depending on where the difference in meaning is located. Take the dis-
puted claim that ‘The argument form p¬¬A ∴ Aq is (in)valid’. The
semantic difference might be located in the meaning of ‘valid’, or in
the meaning of the logical constants or in both.
Call meaning-variance pluralisms stemming from a difference in
the meaning of ‘valid’ structural meaning-variance. A crude version
of this view says that ‘valid’ in Clare’s mouth really means ‘valid-in-
C’, whereas in Ira’s mouth it means ‘invalid-in-I ’. But this misses the
point. Of course, no one—classical or intuitionistic logician—has ever
disputed these claims. The real question is which of the senses of ‘valid’
(if any) adequately captures genuine validity.28
A rather more sophisticated brand of structural meaning-variance
has been advanced by B&R.29 According to B&R’s influential account,
there is a core concept of validity, which can be characterized via a set
of jointly sufficient and individually necessary conditions—necessary
truth-preservation, formality and normativity—and via the so-called
Generalized Tarski Thesis: pΓ ∴L Aq is validL if and only if, in every
caseL in which all of the members of Γ are true, so is A.
Pluralism arises from the fact that the core concept of validity can be
elaborated in several equally legitimate ways depending on how we
interpret ‘case’.
B&R’s structural meaning-variance features prominently in what
follows. Yet, to complete the picture, let us briefly turn to the remaining
two forms of meaning-variance. Operational meaning-variance locates
the difference of meaning in (all or some of) the logical connectives.30
28. One might retort that there is no genuine system-independent concept of
validity; that all there is are system-immanent standards of validity. If this were
true, we would again be left with a rather uninteresting form of pluralism, not
to mention an implausible view of validity.
29. Beall and Restall, op. cit.
30. The terminology is inspired by Gentzen-Prawitz-style proof theory, in
which inference rules are divided into those that feature specific logical op-
erators (operational rules); and those that codify general constraints on the
deducibility relation (structural rules).
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On this view, Clare’s claim might be understood as ‘¬C¬CA ∴ A is
valid’, whereas Ira’s equally correct claim might be read as ‘¬I¬IA ∴
A is invalid’. Again, there is no disagreement except, perhaps, over the
correct use of the logical connectives.31
Finally, on the third view—hybrid meaning-variance—the difference
resides both in the meaning of ‘valid’ and in those of the logical oper-
ators. Some maintain that structural meaning-variance entails opera-
tional meaning-variance.32 I find it difficult to adjudicate these claims
absent a robust account of the meanings of the logical constants. As
I am unaware of any such account, I do not pursue this issue further
here.
So much for meaning-variance. Let us turn now to a different form
of pluralism. Our assumption so far has been that there is what Field
has called an ‘all-purpose logic’.33 The assumption enjoys a consider-
able pedigree. That logic applies unrestrictedly to any subject matter
has, in one form or another, been taken to be a non-negotiable compo-
nent of its job description by many. By contrast, advocates of domain-
relative pluralistm dispute this characterization.34 Inquiry, according to
them, is irreparably compartmentalized, dividing into several distinct
31. Operational meaning-variance only gives rise to pluralism on the assump-
tion that the alternative meanings are equally legitimate. This is by no means
obvious. For example, according to the semantic anti-realist tradition (M. Dum-
mett, The logical basis of metaphysics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1991), D. Prawitz, “Meaning and proofs: On the conflict between classical and
intuitionistic logic,” Theoria 43 (1977), N. Tennant, Anti-realism and logic (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1987)) meaning-theoretic considerations reveal
the classical meanings of the logical constants to be defective, thus favoring
weaker constructive logics.
32. See for instance Priest, op. cit..
33. H. Field, “What is the normative role of logic?,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian
society 83 (2009), p. 345.
34. O. Bueno and S. Shalkowski, “Modalism and Logical Pluralism,” Mind 118
(2009)a˘and N. da Costa, Logique classique et non classique: Essaie sur le fondement
de la logique (Paris: Masson, 1997) fall into this category.
and stable domains.35 No single logic governs all domains. Rather, dif-
ferent domains call for different logics. And so a logic’s normative au-
thority is confined to its proper jurisdiction. We can continue to speak
of the canonical application or core role of logic provided we allow for
it to be relativized to domains.
Applied to the case of Clare and Ira, the domain-relative pluralist
seeks to defuse the dispute by arguing that classical and intuitionistic
logic do not compete for the same domain. The dispute is resolved
by realizing that both logics have their legitimate domains of applica-
tion. Of course, this relies on the assumption that the dispute is not
domain-internal. And that assumption, it is worth emphasizing, is du-
bious. After all, the storied conflict between intuitionists and classical
logicians has traditionally been a conflict over which of the two logics
correctly codifies the standards of correct deductive reasoning in the
domain of mathematics. Hence, even if we were to convert Clare and
Ira to domain-relative pluralism and they were to agree, for instance,
that classical logic governs macroscopic physical objects but that cer-
tain observational predicates obey intuitionistic logic, Clare and Ira
would still not have made any progress in settling the pivotal question
as to which logic to employ in mathematics.
Finally, let us turn to Field’s version of logical pluralism. Field’s
point of the departure is his argument to the effect that ‘validity’ is
not definable in terms of necessary truth-preservation. ‘Validity’ must
be treated as a primitive. Grasping its meaning, however, requires an
appreciation of its conceptual role, which, in turn, is characterized
by the normative constraints validity imposes on our doxastic atti-
tudes.36 Field now couples his normative account of validity with his
35. Domains are typically thought to be individuated by subject matter: think
ethics, mathematics, micro-physics, etc. It is worth noting, though, that some
phenomena, such as vagueness, cut across domains.
36. Field, op. cit., Field, op. cit., H. Field, “What is logical validity?,” in C. Caret
and O. Hjortland (eds.), Foundations of logical consequence (Oxford University
Press, 2015).
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non-factualism about the normative.37 There is, for him, no intelligi-
ble sense in which any one set of norms can be said to be uniquely
correct.38 Saying that there is no correct set of logical norms is not
say that all logical norms are equally good—some can be better than
others. This is because, as a species of epistemic norms, logical norms
are selected with a view to promoting our epistemic goals. Logical
norms can thus be assessed based on how effectively they achieve this
objective. All the same, the picture points to two possible sources of
logical pluralism: i) logical pluralism could be a result of pluralism
about epistemic goals; ii) even if we agree on the epistemic goals we
wish to further, it may be indeterminate which set of norms is most
conducive to those goals. We have no reason to assume there to be a
unique system that best optimizes for our often competing constraints.
Field’s pluralism differs fundamentally from the pluralisms we
have encountered so far: Field’s pluralism makes room—while the
other pluralisms do not—for the possibility of normative conflict.39 On
Field’s view there may be multiple competing evaluative standards. It
follows that Field’s pluralist’s does not necessarily fit the mould of the
pluralist as a dissolver of logical disputes. On the other hand, Field’s
picture differs from the standard type of dispute exemplified by Clare
and Ira, in that it denies the existence of objective evaluative standards.
This concludes our survey of pluralisms. Let us now marry our
findings with those of the previous section by asking which of the
normative assessments introduced there have a role to play within the
37. H. Field, “Epistemology without metaphysics,” Philosophical studies 143
(2009)
38. This is one of the respects in which Field’s pluralism is closer to Carnapian
tolerance Carnap, op. cit.: both authors explicitly reject the notion that logics
can sensibly be called ‘correct’ or ‘true’. If pluralism is narrowly defined as the
position that there exist at least two correct logics, their views do not qualify.
This goes to show that we should not construe ‘logical pluralism’ too narrowly.
39. See also T. Kouri Kissel, “Logical pluralism from a pragmatic perspective,”
Australasian journal of philosophy (Forthcoming) and N. Wyatt and G. Payette,
“Logical pluralism and logical form,” Logique et analyse 61 (2018).
various forms of pluralism. The following table summarizes our find-
ings:
(Objective) (Subjective) (Internal)
Structural MV X
Operational MV X
Domain-relative X-D X-D X
Non-factualism X X
By definition, pluralism does away with the notion of a unique cor-
rect logic. Consequently, none of our pluralisms allow for an objective
bridge principle.40 The only possible exception is domain-relative plu-
ralism. The way we have portrayed the position it allows for objective,
albeit local domain-specific bridge principles.41 What about subjective
bridge principles? If there is no correct logic, can I still legitimately
take myself and others to be bound by an evaluative standard? Most
pluralisms reject this possibility. After all, the point of the pluralist’s in-
tervention was to convince us of the futility of logical disputes. Subjec-
tive principles have no place within such pluralisms. As before, there
are two exceptions. Domain-relative pluralists may countenance local,
domain-internal disputes. Also, Field’s non-factualism admits of con-
flicting subjective bridge principles. While there is no fact of the matter
as to whether Clare or Ira is right, both may be within their rational
rights to adopt and defend their logical policies. Finally, the only type
40. When we introduced our objective principles, we were working under the
provisional assumption of monism. In the present context of neutrality, one
may therefore wonder if objective principles must be monist in nature. Con-
sider the modest pluralism of someone who regards classical and intuitionistic
logic as equally ‘correct’. Instantiating the objective principles above, the likely
consequence is, for instance, that one (objectively) may and that one may not
infer A from ¬¬A. I confess that I cannot make much sense of such a view
(save in the case of epistemic value pluralism, which I discuss below).
41. One could equally imagine a non-factualist variant of the domain-relative
pluralism—a hybrid between domain-relative pluralism and Field’s non-
factualism, if you will—which rejects even local correctness.
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of normative assessment that has a place in all pluralist views are in-
ternal assessments. In endorsing a logic one commits oneself to the
associated norms. Pluralists may allow for me to adopt different logics
for different purposes or for particular domains of discourse, but this
cannot mean that one gets to pick and choose among the principles of
different available logics in the course of one’s reasoning as one pleases.
Were it permitted to do so, pluralism would collapse into monism with
respect to the union of all of the parochial logics. Therefore, given that
I operate with a logic within a specified context, I thereby take myself
to be bound by the laws of that logic and so am subject to appropriate
internal criticisms.
The upshot of these considerations is that meaning variance-based
pluralisms are able to accommodate only a very thin, internal norma-
tive status. In the next section, I discuss whether this attenuated con-
ception of logical normativity is viable.
4. The collapse argument
My main focus in the following is B&R’s pluralism. As we just noted,
on B&R’s view, a given conception of consequence cannot normatively
bind us in virtue of being correct or even by being taken to be so. As far
as Clare and Ira’s dispute is concerned, neither of their logical practices
is susceptible to external criticism. The two have simply elected to play
by different, albeit equally acceptable rules. We are left only with a
purely system-immanent notion of correctness.
This observation points to a difficulty for B&R’s view. Logical
norms do not seem to bind us merely in the way that the rules of a
game bind us. I take myself to be answerable to the rules of chess only
so long as I wish to play chess. Logic, by contrast, is not a game I can
choose not to play. Assuming logic is normative for reasoning, its role
in our epistemic lives is indispensable. The principles of logic, unlike
the rules of a game, are answerable to an external standard, to wit, our
broader epistemic aims. Consequently, they must be coordinated with
our non-logical epistemic norms.42
This, I submit, is the normative source of the so-called ‘collapse
argument’ against B&R’s pluralism.43 The argument, in summary, is
this. Suppose that A is known to be true and that B is a (relevant)
proposition. Let L1 and L2 be two distinct admissible logics such that
|=L2( |=L1 . In particular, suppose that A |=L1 B, but A 6|=L2 B. Do
we have logical grounds for believing B? We clearly do on B&R’s ac-
count. We need not worry that L1 might lead us astray. After all, L1
is admissible and so truth-preserving. But if so, the conclusion seems
irresistible that, in view of my epistemic aims, I ought to choose an
L1-based bridge principle over the L2-based principle, lest I pass up
the opportunity to come to know B. L1, as we might put it, norma-
tively dominates L2. And so one bridge principle—the one featuring
the stronger of the two logics—imposes itself, giving rise to the follow-
ing objective evaluative principle:44
(BP-|=L1 -) If |=L2⊆ |=L1 , and A1, . . . An |=L1 C, then S ought not
(believe the Ai and disbelieve C).
This suggests that once we factor in our wider epistemic goals, B&R’s
central claim to the effect that both logics (and their attendant norms)
are equally permissible, is false. Notice that the argument does not
rely on particularly contentious assumptions about one’s epistemic
value theory. It merely assumes that, all things being equal, a logic
42. While B&R list normativity among their three admissibility criteria Beall
and Restall, op. cit., §2.4, they fail to take the wider epistemic significance of
logical normativity into account. Left merely with the internal normative di-
mension, it is hard to see what work the normativity criterion is doing for
them. After all, any consequence relation can trivially be regarded as setting
forth norms for anyone who endorses it.
43. See Priest, op. cit., Priest, op. cit., Read, op. cit., Keefe, op. cit., and C. Caret,
“The collapse of logical pluralism has been greatly exaggerated,” Erkenntnis 82
(2017).
44. For simplicity, I present only the variants of our go-to example (Objective
Omissive -).
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that licences more inferences to potentially epistemically valuable con-
clusions is to be preferred.
Our conclusion straightforwardly generalizes. Where we are con-
fronted with various admissible logics that are totally ordered in terms
of strength, we simply pick the strongest of the bunch.45 In cases where
the admissible logics are not totally ordered, the lesson that we ought
to exploit our logical resources still applies. In the simplest case where
we have two admissible logics, L1 and L2, that are incomparable with
respect to inclusion (as, for example, in the case of intuitionistic logic
and a standard system of relevant logic), the apposite principle would
seem to be:
(BP-(|=L1 ∨ |=L2)) If A1, . . . An |=L1 C or A1, . . . An |=L2 C, then S
ought not (believe the Ai and not believe C).
Generalizing beyond the case of two logics, we arrive at the following:
(BP-∪ |=Li ) If there exists an admissible Li, such that A1, . . . An |=Li
C, then S ought not (believe the Ai and not believe C).46
The upshot of these reflections is that B&R’s pluralism is vulnerable
to a kind of upward collapse. Once our broader epistemic commit-
ments are duly taken into account, it looks as if we ought to adopt
the strongest available consequence relation among our admissible log-
ics.47 We thus find ourselves bereft of any rationale for endorsing a
weaker logic.
How might B&R respond to the collapse worry? B&R are advocates
of negative bridge principles: ‘if an argument is valid,’ they write, ‘then
45. As before, I am assuming that logics are ordered by inclusion over their
consequence relations.
46. A word of caution is in order here. The taking of unions of consequence
relations may result in a trivial system. An example is given by Abelian and
classical propositional logic Read, op. cit.: in Abelian logic we have ¬A, B |=A
((A → B) → B) → A, whereas classical logic yields ¬A, B |=C ¬(((A → B) →
B)→ A).
47. Cf. Keefe, op. cit..
you somehow go wrong if you accept the premises but reject the conclu-
sion’.48 The collapse argument is driven by the fact that in opting for
a weaker logic one forgoes the opportunity to acquire an epistemically
valuable belief. Perhaps, though, it is a mistake to construe the norma-
tivity of logic as issuing obligations to believe—even wide-scope ones.
B&R’s favored negative bridge principles are mere safeguards of log-
ical coherence: I can comply with the bridge principle, simply by not
bearing any kind of attitude at all towards the conclusion of a valid ar-
gument, just so long as I do not ‘actively’ disbelieve it (while believing
the premises). However, this response is of little help to the pluralist,
even if negative principles were to win the day. For even according to
our negative principle the weaker logic L2 fares worse epistemically
than L1: plainly, L2 permits disbelieving true propositions (and L1-
consequences) such as B.49
Colin Caret has proposed a different response on behalf of B&R.50
Following Hjortland and Shapiro, Caret proposes to interpret B&R’s
version of meaning-variance as a form of contextualism about the
meaning of the validity predicate.51 The predicate’s meaning must be
understood relative to a contextually determined standard of logical
strictness. Certain types of cases (incomplete ones, inconsistent ones,
etc.) will be live options in some contexts, thus raising the strictness
bar by requiring us to consider a larger class of cases; other contexts
will impose laxer standards allowing us to disregard certain cases thus
48. Beall and Restall, op. cit., p.16.
49. What is more, as MacFarlane, op. cit. remarks, negative principles seem too
weak, at least on their own. Take, for instance, the case of the aforementioned
(Subjective Omissive -). Suppose my colleague refutes the claim A ∧ B. She
rightly points out that I have previously professed belief in both A and B,
though separately. Intuitively, I am under rational pressure to abandon at least
one of my beliefs. But the negative principle does not account for that pressure.
Instead it affords me a dubious loophole: my endorsing A and B merely pro-
vides me with an obligation not to disbelieve A∧ B. Surely, though, the situation
demands more of me. It demands that I own up to my doxastic commitment
towards A ∧ B.
50. Caret, op. cit.
51. See Hjortland, op. cit. and S. Shapiro, Varieties of logic (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2014).
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leaving room for ‘more’ logical implications. Since strict contexts man-
date weaker logics, contextualism appears to stave off the threat of
collapse by providing the previously lacking rationale for espousing a
weaker logic.
Caret’s idea is elegant, but not ultimately convincing in my view.
For one, the notion of a variable standard of logical strictness lacks
motivation. Caret models his proposal after epistemic contextualism,
according to (a version of) which, ‘knows’ is to be interpreted rela-
tive to a contextual parameter expressing an epistemic standard. Dif-
ferent contexts call for different standards, thus altering the extension
of ‘knows’ accordingly. Wherever one ultimately stands on the viability
of epistemic contextualism, it is hard to deny that the position enjoys
at least a prima facie intuitive pull. The same cannot be said for Caret’s
proposal. I see no good reason for thinking that our validity judgments
are in fact sensitive to a strictness parameter, nor, for that matter, that
they should be. We simply do not ordinarily recognize contexts that
select for different stricter or laxer logical standards and so for weaker
and stronger logics. To be sure, we may at times ‘try on’ different logics
as a possible way of resolving a paradox (as in Caret’s example of the
liar (idem)) or to accommodate persistently recalcitrant data. But such
cases are more readily thought of as instances of suppositional reason-
ing. In much the same way in which I might posit the truth of certain
propositions to explore their consequences in the course of theoretical
deliberation, I might posit the validity or invalidity of a principle of
logic in order to weigh the costs and benefits of each of my options,
e.g. ‘Ought I to restrict the truth-predicate or should I revise my logic
in order to account for semantic paradoxes?’52 But engaging in deliber-
ation of this kind does not commit me to logical pluralism, nor is there
any need to wheel in contextualist machinery to make sense of it.
52. Peter P. Schroeder-Heister, “A natural extension of natural deduction,” Jour-
nal of symbolic logic 49 (1984) proposes a natural deduction calculus that allows
for the introduction of dischargeable deductive rules in the context of suppo-
sitions, which can be thought of as a proof-theoretic representation of such
logical suppositions.
Let us turn now to the final response. The collapse argument makes
certain assumptions about the role of logic in our epistemic lives and
about the epistemic ends we pursue. These assumptions are suffi-
ciently weak to be compatible with a wide variety of epistemic value
theories. It might, however, be said to rely on the tacit assumption of
epistemic monism in that it presumed there to be but one fundamen-
tal epistemic value (e.g. truth or knowledge). Perhaps, then, the absent
motive for logical pluralism resides in pluralism about epistemic value.
Weaker logics impose constraints beyond mere truth-preservation on
the notion of logical consequence. Perhaps some of these constraints
can be motivated by appeal to alternative epistemic values? Perhaps
so. But even if value pluralism is correct, we are still owed a story as to
what these values are and how the candidate logics might promote or
respect these values. As things stand, it is hard to make out even the
contours of such an account. Certainly, it is unclear how these logics
might relate to the types of values often invoked such as understand-
ing or wisdom.
5. Domain-relative pluralism
Let us then consider a different strategy for dodging the collapse worry.
Since this strategy amounts to a more radical departure from B&R’s
pluralism, it merits separate treatment. The strategy consists in parry-
ing the collapse argument by espousing domain-relative pluralism.53
Domain-relative pluralism, recall, is the view that different domains of
discourse select different logics. The domain-relativist’s response to the
collapse argument is simple: while the stronger logic in the example
above may be appropriate for some domains, some domains may not
support all of its implications and so may require a weaker logic. The
53. B&R are unequivocal in their rejection of domain-relative pluralism, see
Beall and Restall, op. cit., p. 88.
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threat of collapse is thus blocked by compartmentalizing our logics’
domains of application.
Domain-relative pluralism raises an important question well known
in the literature on alethic pluralism as the problem of mixed compounds.
Adapted to our present concerns, the question can be put thus: What
are we to make of logically complex propositions the atomic parts of
which pertain to domains governed by distinct logics? And what are
we to make of inferences involving premises pertaining to domains
governed by distinct logics? Far from being a niche phenomenon, cross-
domain reasoning is commonplace and of central importance to our
intellectual pursuits. The mathematical, the physical, the ethical, the le-
gal, the aesthetic and so on are frequently intermingled in our attempts
to make sense of the world. Domain-relative pluralists must therefore
be able to account for propositions and inferences that straddle muliple
domains.
How might the pluralist approach this challenge? To keep things
simple, consider a toy example involving just two domains: that of
mathematics, DM, and that of macro-physics, DP. In keeping with our
story line, let us assume that our pluralist endorses intuitionistic logic
within the mathematical domain and classical logic within the physi-
cal domain. Now let A be a mathematical proposition and B a physical
proposition, both true in their respective domains. Given these assump-
tions, the question is this: What are we to make of A ? B, where ? is a
logical connective? There are three possibilities:
• Treat A ? B as if it belonged to DM;
• Treat A ? B as if it belonged to DP;
• Treat A ? B as belonging to DM • DP,
where DM • DP is a status that functionally depends on DM and DP
but is distinct from both.
Nikolaj Pedersen and Cory Wright, in their structurally analogous
discussion of alethic pluralism, go in for the first option.54 It will be
54. See N. J. L. L. Pedersen and C.D. Wright, “Pluralist theories of truth,” in
helpful to introduce some terminology. Let us again assume a partial
ordering, ≤, by inclusion over our logics. Let us say that, for any propo-
sition P, λ(P) is the logic governing P in virtue of the domain to which
P pertains. In our example, we have λ(A) = I and λ(B) = C and
thus λ(A) ≤ λ(B). Following a standard move in algebraic semantics,
Pederson and Wright now treat conjunction and disjunction as ‘mini-
mizing’ and ‘maximizing’ operations respectively. In our context this
amounts to:
λ(A ∧ B) = min(λ(A),λ(B))
λ(A ∨ B) = max(λ(A),λ(B))
But this cannot be quite right as the following simple argument reveals.
Suppose I prove ¬¬C, for some C ∈ DM, where C is not effectively
decidable. Because DM is governed by intuitionistic logic, I am not per-
mitted to infer C. However, if the proposal were correct, I would have
a ready-made strategy for circumventing these intuitionistic strictures.
Simply disjoin the conclusion with a random physical falsehood, P,
yielding ¬¬C ∨ P. But ¬¬C ∨ P is subject to classical logic and so is
equivalent to C ∨ P. And since we know that ¬P, an application of dis-
junctive syllogism yields the purely mathematical C. Nothing hangs
E. Zalta (ed.), Stanford encyclodedia of philosophy (2013), §4.5.2. The objection to
follow does not necessarily apply to them. It does, however, carry over if the
different truth-properties associated with the two domains were to induce dif-
ferent logics. While alethic pluralism certainly does not entail logical pluralism,
the former does naturally entrain the latter given certain assumptions, see M.
Lynch, Truth as one and many (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 95–96
and N. J. L. L. Pedersen, “Pluralism x 3: Truth, logic, metaphysics,” Erkenntnis
79 (2014) himself. Going in the opposite direction, S. Read, “Review of J.C. Beall
and G. Restall, Logical pluralism, Clarendon Press, 2006,” Notre Dame philosoph-
ical reviews (2006) argues that B&R would do well to endorse alethic pluralism.
It should be emphasized, though, that B&R reject alethic pluralism (p. 100).
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on the specifics of my example. The same (or analogous) arguments
can be generated for similar cases.
To avoid such difficulties a retreat to what Lynch has called ‘logical
modesty’ recommends itself:
Logical modesty: Where a compound proposition or inference con-
tains propositions from distinct domains, the default governing
logic is that of the compound or inference’s weakest member.55
Logical modesty is a plausible stance. However, as it stands it presup-
poses the comparability of all logics involved, which, we said, is not
always possible. For instance, we have |=I 6⊆|=R and |=R 6⊆|=I (where
I is intuitionistic logic and R the system of relevant implication.) How
to proceed? In analogy with our development of the collapse argument
in the previous section where we took the union of the relevant conse-
quence relations, the natural move here is instead to take the intersec-
tion of the logics in question. This is in the spirit of logical modesty:
When engaging in cross-domain reasoning, we should draw only on
principles sanctioned by all the relevant logics. We thus arrive at the
following
• (BP-∩ |=Li ) If for all Li, A |=Li C, then S ought not (believe A and
disbelieve C).
Thus, whereas the collapse argument results in an upward collapse into
monism, domain-relative pluralism gives rise to a downward collapse.
The direction of the collapse is determined by whether the admissible
logics are reliable or not. In the context of B&R’s pluralism all logics
in question are admissible and so necessarily truth-preserving. In the
present case, different logics can be reliably applied only in their ap-
propriate domains. Misapplying a stronger logic in a ‘weaker’ domain
may lead us from truth to falsity.
The question now is whether the downward collapse of domain-
relative pluralism when it comes to cross-domain discourse also
55. Lynch, op. cit., p. 100.
amounts to an all-out collapse into monism? I turn to this question
in the next section.
6. Duck-rabbit pluralism
It will not have escaped the attentive reader’s attention that Clare and
Ira have been absent throughout our discussion of pluralism.56 Hap-
pily, they are making a reappearance in our present discussion. It is
important to bear in mind for the upcoming act that, their obvious dif-
ferences of opinion notwithstanding, Clare and Ira’s philosophies of
logic are largely aligned. In particular, both are staunch monists.
Let us focus on Ira. Ira, as we know, rejects classical logic in favor
of intuitionistic logic. She does so because she maintains that char-
acteristically classical principles lack universal validity and so cannot
form part of the correct logic. Intuitionistic principles, by contrast, do
hold without fail in all domains according to her. Ira’s view does not
prevent her from calling upon classical principles when reasoning in
circumstances in which she thinks they do hold. However, in so doing
she accords classical principles the status of domain-specific non-logical
principles of inference, much in the way in which one might legiti-
mately appeal to the principle that the whole is greater than its proper
parts outside of infinitary set theory.57
In a dramatic twist, a third character steps on the scene: Dora. Dora
agrees with Ira both that intuitionistic restrictions of classical logic are
warranted and where these are warranted. The twist, though, is that
Dora is a domain-relative pluralist. Where for Ira a logical principle’s
membership in the correct logic and its universal validity are neces-
sarily linked, Dora’s position is that the two may come apart. That is,
where Ira views local failures of validity as decisive demonstrations
that classical principles have no place in the correct logic, Dora does
56. I am borrowing the phrase ‘duck-rabbit’ pluralism from Priest, op. cit..
57. I set aside recent accounts of infinite sets that preserve the part-whole prin-
ciple. See P. Mancosu, “Measuring the size of infinite collections of natural
numbers: Was Cantor’s theory of infinite number inevitable?,” The review of
symbolic logic 2 (2009) for discussion.
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treat classical principles as genuinely valid, albeit only within the con-
fines of their rightful domain.
Hence, while Ira and Dora deploy the same principles in the same
contexts, the difference between their views stems from their conflict-
ing verdicts regarding the logical status of classical principles. For ex-
ample, both condone the use of DNE when reasoning about decid-
able domains. However, Dora treats the principle as a logical validity
relative to the appropriate domains, whereas Ira insists on treating it as
non-logical because merely domain-specific. The two are thus in com-
plete agreement with respect to the norms of reasoning to which they
hold themselves. They disagree only in that Dora uses ‘valid’, ‘logical’
and their cognates more liberally, while Ira reserves these honorifics
for principles she takes to be universally applicable. Viewed in this
way, the conflict between the monist and the domain-relative plural-
ist seems to come down to a mere semantic squabble. After all, what
substantive questions could possibly hang on our being more or less
liberal in our application of ‘valid’ and ‘logical principle’?58
One might be tempted to point to the fact that Ira’s stricter inter-
pretation has the longstanding tradition of treating its formality or ‘lack
of subject matter’ as partially definitive of logic on its side.59 What
characterizes logic as a discipline (at least in part), on this view, is its
unrestricted applicability. But these considerations are of little succor
to Ira. After all, we already knew that Ira does, while Dora does not,
build universal applicability into her conception of logicality. The ques-
tion is whether there are good reasons for doing so. And the trouble
is that accounts of logicality in this tradition do not deliver on reasons.
Logic’s universality, rather, is posited as an unexplained explainer.
A prima facie more promising objection has been levelled at the
monist.60 By virtue of her uncompromising conception of logicality,
58. This discussion draws in part on Priest, op. cit., p. 203
59. J. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that logic is formal? (Ph. D. diss.),
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2000
60. B&R themselves advance this argument. See Beall and Restall, op. cit., p. 93.
See also Bueno and Shalkowski, op. cit..
the monist effectively adopts a position of logical modesty with re-
spect to all discourse (not merely for cross-domain discourse). Accord-
ing to her, the only bona fide laws of logic are those that hold good
in all domains. But here’s the rub: scarcely any logical principle has
gone unchallenged in one context or another. Hence, if for sufficiently
many domains our best overall theory requires weakening our logic,
the monist runs the risk of finding herself with an unworkably weak
or even empty consequence relation. Call this the Objection From the
Threat of Logical Nihilism.
The threat of nihilism also seems to show Dora to be in an ad-
vantageous position when making potentially logic-altering theoreti-
cal decisions. For let us suppose our best theory of a given domain is
faced with persistent recalcitrant data. Let us assume, moreover, that
we could accommodate the data by either revising the theory in ques-
tion or by locally abandoning certain logical laws. How would Ira and
Dora approach this theoretical choice? Ira, the monist, would seem to
have a very strong incentive not to tinker with her logic lest she ends
up with a cripplingly weak all-purpose logic. These global theoretical
considerations thus impose stiff constraints on Ira’s local theoretical
choices. Dora, by contrast, appears to enjoy a great deal more flexibil-
ity, which would appear to be an asset.
But this picture is misleading. The trouble is that it overlooks the
insights from our discussion of the downward collapse problem. For
when it comes to cross-domain discourse, the pluralist and the monist
are in the same boat: both are equally committed to logical modesty
when several domains are involved. In such cases both must make do
with the principles that hold in all the relevant domains. It follows that,
local logical revision in response to theoretical pressures are likely to
come at a heavy cost also for the pluralist. Ira and Dora are thus both
subject to a standing pro tanto injunction in favor of logical conserva-
tiveness.
True, the pluralist’s and and monist’s dialectical situations are not
identical: while the monist is always committed to a core logic applica-
ble across all domains, the pluralist must resort to logical modesty only
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in ‘worst-case’ scenarios involving particular restrictive cross-domain
discourse. But the force of this response is significantly mitigated by
the following two considerations. First, recall that the monist too can
augment her core logic by introducing domain-specific (non-logical
principles) where appropriate. As we have seen in the case of Ira and
Dora, both the monist and domain-relative pluralist have access to the
same principles. Simply, Ira is more sparing in which of the principles
she considers genuinely logical. Second, cross-domain discourse, far
from being a fringe phenomenon, is crucial to our intellectual pursuits.
As Lynch aptly puts it
reason, by its nature, is universal in its scope—it allows us
to combine propositions from different domains into more
complex propositions, and to make inferences across different
subjects—as when we draw moral conclusions from partly non-
moral premises.61
In short, the threat of nihilism (or at least the threat of an imprac-
tically weak logic) afflicts both the domain-relative pluralist and the
monist to a significant degree. It is not clear, to say the least, that this
tips the balance in the pluralist’s favor.
Is there anything, then, that could convince us that Ira and Dora are
embroiled in more than a terminological tangle? One option would be
for Ira to show that there is more to (what she calls) genuine logical prin-
ciples than universal validity—some distinctive property that would
set properly logical principles apart from merely domain-specific prin-
ciples. Different types of accounts are conceivable: genuine logicality
might manifest itself by way of distinct metaphysical property or per-
haps via a distinctive normative profile. I explore neither of these op-
tions here. If either could be shown to stick, this would demonstrate
the illegitimacy of the domain-relativist’s description of the situation.
But even in the absence of such a demonstration, our discussion has
shown that domain-relative pluralism amounts to nothing more than a
61. Lynch, op. cit., p. 86
re-description of monism. We have found no good reason for choosing
the pluralist duck over the monist rabbit.
7. Conclusion
Here is what we have established. We have analysed the normative
structure of logical disputes and we have provided a classification of
logical pluralist views in accordance with their strategy for resolving
such disputes. Among the forms of pluralism that offered such a strat-
egy at all, we distinguished meaning-variance pluralisms and (certain)
domain-relative pluralisms. The former leave no room for external as-
sessments, the latter allow for external assessments when it comes to
disputes about a particular domain. I argued that both types of plural-
ism (or at least the viable representatives thereof) ultimately collapse
into monism. Consequently, the only forms of genuine logical plural-
ism compatible with the normativity of logic are ones that allow for
logical disputes. More succinctly put: if logic is normative, competi-
tion between logics may be inevitable.
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